Posts for category ‘Finance’

Thinking of taking your information technology company to the next level with a major marketing campaign or by hiring additional sales resources? These are decisions that can impact your company’s future. It might be time to consider the alternative of selling your business.

We are often approached by software company or information technology business owners at a crossroads of taking the company to the next level. The decision in most cases is whether they should bring on the one or two hot shot sales people or channel development people necessary to bring the company sales to a level that will allow the company to reach critical mass. For a smaller company with sales below $5 million this can be a critical decision.

For frame of reference, prior to embarking on my merger and acquisition advisor career, I spent my prior 20 years in various sales capacities in primarily information technology and computer industry related companies from bag carrying salesman to district, regional, to national sales manager and finally Chief Marketing Officer. So when I look at a company, it is from the sales and marketing perspective first and foremost. I am sure that if I had a public accounting background, I would look at my clients through those lenses.

So with that backdrop, let’s look at what might be a typical situation. The soft ware company is doing $3.5 million in sales, has a good group of loyal customers, produces a nice income for its owner or owners, and has a lot more potential for sales growth in the opinion of the owner. Some light bulb has been lit that suggests that they need to step this up to the next level after relying on word of mouth and the passion and energy of the owner to get to this stage.

I have either spoken with more than 30, primarily technology based companies over the years that have faced this exact situation and can count on one hand the ones that had a successful outcome. The natural inclination is to bite the bullet and bring on that expensive resource and hope your staff can keep up with the big influx of orders. The reality is that in most cases the execution was a very expensive failure. Below are several factors that you should consider when you are at this crossroads:

1. The 80 20 rule of salesmen. You know this one. 80% of sales are produced by 20% of the salespeople. If you are only hiring one or two, the likelihood is that you will not get a top performer.

2. The president of the company and decision maker has no sales background so the odds of him making the right hiring decision are greatly diminished. He will not understand how to properly set milestones, judge progress, evaluate performance objectively, or coach the new hire.

3. To hire a good salesman that can handle a complex sale requires a base salary and a draw for at least 6 months that puts him in a better economic condition than he was in on his last job. So you are probably looking at $150,000 annual run rate for a decent candidate.

4. If you have not had a formalized sales effort before, you are probably lacking the sales infrastructure that your new hire is used to. Proper contact management systems, customer and prospect databases, developed collateral materials and sales presentations, sales cycle timeframes and critical milestones and developed competition feature benefit matrixes will need to be developed.

5. Current customers are most likely the early adapters, risk takers, pioneers, etc. and are not afraid of making the buying decision with a small more risky company. These early adaptors, however, are not viewed as good references for the more conservative majority that needs the security of a big company backing their product selection decision.

6. Your new hire is most likely someone that came from a bigger information technology company and may be comfortable performing in an established sales department. It is the rare salesman that can transform from that environment to developing the environment while trying to meet a sales quota. Throw on top of that the objection that he has never had to deal with before, the small company risk factor, and the odds of success diminish. Finally, this transformation from a core group of early adapters to now selling to the conservative majority elongates the sales cycle by 25% to as much as double his prior experience. If you don’t fire him first, he will probably quit when his draw runs out.

With all this going against the business owner, most of them go ahead and make the hire and then I hear something like this, “Yes, we brought on a sales guy two years ago who said he had all the industry contacts and in nine months after he hadn’t sold a thing and cost us a lot of money, we fired him. That really hurt the company and we have just now recovered. We won’t do that again.”

What are the alternatives? Certainly strategic alliances, channel partnerships, value added resellers are options, but again the success rate for these arrangements are suspect without the sales background in the executive suite. A lower risk approach is to outsource your VP of Sales or Chief Marketing Officer function. There are a number of highly experienced and talented free lancers that you can hire on a consulting basis that can help you establish a sales and marketing infrastructure and guide you through the staffing process. That may be the best way to go.

An option that one of our clients chose when faced with the six points to consider from above was to sell his company. This is a very difficult decision for an entrepreneur who by nature is very optimistic about the future and feels like he can clear any hurdle. This client had no sales background but was a very smart subject matter expert with an outstanding background as a former consultant with a Big 5 accounting firm. He did not make the hiring mistake, but instead went the outsourcing of VP of Sales function as step 1. When their firm wanted to make the transition from the early adapters to the conservative majority, the sales cycle slowed to a crawl. Meanwhile their technology advantage was being eroded by a well funded venture backed competitor that had struck an alliance with a big vendor.

They engaged our firm to find them a buyer, but then we encountered the valuation gap. Our business seller thought his company was worth a great deal and that he should be paid with cash at close for all the future potential his product could deliver. The buyer, on the other hand, wanted to pay based on a trailing twelve months historical perspective and if anything was paid for potential, that would be in the form of an earn out based on post acquisition sales performance.

With a well structured earn out agreement and the right buyer, our client will reach his transaction value goals. His earn out is based on future sales, but his effective sales force has been increased from one (himself) to 27 reps. His install base has been increased from 14 to 800. Every one of the buyer’s current customers is a candidate for this product. The small company risk has been removed going from a little known start-up with $500 K in revenues to a well known industry player, publicly traded stock with a market cap of $2.5 billion.

He avoided the big cash drain that a bad sales person hiring decision would have created and he sold his company before a competitor dominated the market and made his technology irrelevant and of minimal value.

My professional contacts sometimes tease me and suggest that I think every company should be sold. That may be a slight exaggeration, but in many instances, a company sale is the best route. When a information technology business owner is faced with that crossroads decision of bringing on a significant sales resource that will be faced with a complex sale and the executive suite does not have the sales background, a company sale may be the best outcome.

As a Merger and Acquisition advisor, we regularly dialogue with the top executives in the information technology industry. We have to chuckle when we reach a decision maker with a large IT company and he says, “We have a corporate policy that we do not buy companies.” Does this guy read the industry publications? Is his company’s development group that good? Does he understand the first mover advantage or window of opportunity?

We have gotten past the dizzying array of Internet product introductions, but the pace of technology introduction has again returned to robust levels. Any large company that feels it can keep pace with this force through internal development efforts alone is headed down the path of extinction.

Almost everyone will agree that information technology will be a primary driver of controlling costs in U.S. industry. Technology is our answer to remaining competitive in this world economy. A great deal of the technology development is coming from small, entrepreneurial, nimble, low overhead companies.

There is, however, a huge paradox in the market. The institutional buyers of technology are relatively conservative late adapters. This prevents the expected innovation and commercial success that should naturally follow the innovation and passion of these small technology innovators.

These entrepreneurs respond to a market need and achieve encouraging initial success from the early adopters. They soon hit the wall and are not able to “cross the chasm” from a small group of early adaptors to general market acceptance from the conservative majority. There is little economic value created when good technology is in the control or a failing company and the technology never reaches broad acceptance.

Most of the blockbuster new products are the result of an entrepreneurial effort from an early stage company bootstrapping its growth in a very cost conscious lean environment. Think of some of the new developments from companies like Google. The big companies, with all their seeming advantages have a very high internal cost structure for new product introductions and the losses resulting from those failures are substantial.

Don’t get me wrong, there were hundreds of failures from the start-ups as well. However, the failure for the edgy little start-up resulted in losses in the $1 – $5 million range. The same result from an industry giant were often in the $100 million to $250 million range.

For every Yahoo or Ebay there are literally hundreds of companies that either flame out or never reach a critical mass beyond a loyal early adapter market. It seems like the mentality of these smaller business owners is, using the example of the popular TV show, Deal or No Deal, to hold out for the $1 million briefcase. What about that logical contestant that objectively weighs the facts and the odds and cashes out for $280,000?

As we contemplated the dynamics of this market, we were drawn to a merger and acquisition model that is used in the networking technology market by Cisco Systems. We believe that model could also be applied to great advantage in the Information Technology industry. The giant networking company, is a serial acquirer of companies. They do a tremendous amount of R&D and organic product development. They recognize, however, that they cannot possibly capture all the new developments in this rapidly changing field through internal development alone.

Cisco seeks out investments in promising, small, technology companies and this approach has been a key element in their market dominance. They bring what we refer to as smart money to the high tech entrepreneur. They purchase a minority stake in the early stage company with a call option on acquiring the remainder at a later date with an agreed-upon valuation multiple. This structure is a brilliantly elegant method to dramatically enhance the risk reward profile of new product introduction. Here is why:

For the Entrepreneur:

1. The involvement of Large IT Investor – resources, market presence, brand, distribution capability is a self fulfilling prophecy to your product’s success. The halo of the big secure company helps you cross the chasm to the conservative majority institutional customer.

2. For the same level of dilution that an entrepreneur would get from a venture capital, angel investor or private equity group, the entrepreneur gets the performance leverage of “smart money.” See #1.

3. The entrepreneur gets to grow his business with Large IT Investor’s support at a far more rapid pace than he could alone. He is more likely to establish the critical mass needed for market leadership within his industry’s brief window of opportunity.

4. He gets an exit strategy with an established valuation metric while the buyer/investor helps him make his exit much more lucrative.

5. As an old Wharton professor used to ask, “What would you rather have, all of a grape or part of a watermelon?” That sums it up pretty well. The involvement of Large IT Investor gives the product a much better probability of growing significantly. The entrepreneur will own a meaningful portion of a far bigger asset.

For the Large IT Investor:

1. Create access to a large funnel of developing technology and products.

2. Creates a very nimble, market sensitive, product development or R&D arm.

3. Minor resource allocation to the autonomous operator during his “skunk works” market proving development stage.

4. Diversify their product development portfolio – because this approach provides for a relatively small investment in a greater number of opportunities fueled by the entrepreneurial spirit, they greatly improve the probability of creating a winner.

5. By investing early and getting an equity position in a small company and favorable valuation metrics on the call option, they pay a fraction of the market price to what they would have to pay if they acquired the company once the product had proven successful.

For the past 20 years you have built your information technology business. Your company has become part of your identity. Even when you are not at work, you are working, thinking, planning. You never stop. If you sell you are leaving behind much more than a job. In this article we will discuss some reasons that might indicate that it is time to sell your information technology company.

1. Late in your working life you are faced with a major system re-write, sales force expansion or capital requirement in order for your company to maintain its competitive position.

2. A large competitor is taking market share away from you at an accelerating pace.

3. Your legacy system or competitive advantage has been “leap frogged” by a smaller, nimble, entrepreneurial firm.

4. A major company just acquired a direct competitor and will be aggressively growing the business.

5. Your fire to compete at your top level is not burning as brightly as it once did.

6. Your kids are not interested or are not capable of running the business.

7. You have had a health scare and have decided to smell the flowers.

8. You have lost a major client of a key employee.

9. The market is hot and you decide to take some chips off the table for asset diversification.

10. You exit in an orderly fashion and from a position of strength as you intended.

Lets look at these in a little more detail.

Major capital investment, system upgrade or sales force expansion required – You are supposed to be diversifying your assets, not concentrating them even further. Think about a simple payback analysis. Does that extend beyond your retirement date? You want to be able to defend that investment with the energy and intensity you devoted when you were originally growing your business. Maybe it is time to bring in an equity partner with smart money, an industry buyer with the management depth, infrastructure, or distribution network to protect that investment. You might consider selling now with a three-year employment contract. Let the new owner fund the required capital investment and defend that investment with his larger capital base.

A Large Competitor is Taking Market Share Away from You – Believe me, the news is not going to get better. As an investor you would probably sell the stock in a company you owned if Microsoft or GE decided to assume a presence in that market. Business owners often struggle with objectivity when a similar event takes place in their own company’s industry.

Your Legacy Systems have been “Leap Frogged” by a Nimble Entrepreneurial Firm – This happens all the time and can cause an erosion of your customer base. Your inertia will sustain you for a while, but eventually you will begin to experience customer defections. You can either rewrite, acquire or sell. If you decide to sell, do so before losing too many clients.

A giant company in your industry just acquired one of your major competitors. Watch out, they did not make this acquisition to maintain status quo. They want to grow their market share. They will be coming after your clients. The good news is that as a defensive measure, one or more of their competitors will be compelled to make a similar acquisition. It is best to be aggressively ahead of the curve and get acquired while the market is hot and prices are being bid upwards.

Your interest and competitive fire is eroding. Let’s face it, if you are not growing, you most likely are contracting. Your competition was tough when you were on your game. Your family’s net worth is under attack if you are no longer fully committed.

Your original plan was to turn your business over to your children. They may not be interested or capable of competing at this level. Perhaps the greatest legacy you can leave to your kids is to convert your company into a diversified portfolio of financial assets that are far less risky than turning complex company in a highly competitive industry over to inexperienced managers.

You have a health scare and all of a sudden you start thinking of all the sacrifices you made and all the things you want to do before it is too late. Your list of goals is immediately changed from financial in nature to family, friends, travel, experiences, philanthropy, etc. You might want to listen to your heart this time.

You have lost a major client or a key employee. That can be a real blow to a business. The owner, by nature, is optimistic and believes that the lost business will soon be replaced and does not ratchet down the expense level to match this new sales level. If he does cut, inevitably, it is not fast enough and not deep enough. Maybe it is time to seek a buyer that could replace that business before your company’s value is severely impaired as your profits erode.

The market is hot and you decide to take some chips off the table for diversification. You may be thinking of retiring in four years, but a consolidation is occurring in your industry and valuations are up 20%. Sell at the top and sign a four-year employment or consulting contract. The odds are that if you exit on your original schedule, valuations will have settled back down to the norm.

You ring the bell and exit on your own terms, from a position of strength, exactly like you planned. You are well aware of the competitive forces in the market and the relative strength or weakness in valuation multiples. You have prepared your business to be attractive to a strategic buyer. Everything is going your way. You hire a good M&A advisory firm to present you confidentially to the most likely buyers. Several recognize your value and show interest. You are able to get a little competitive bidding going. Your transaction value rises and your terms improve. You pull the trigger and complete the sale. Mission Accomplished.

One of the most challenging aspects of selling a healthcare information technology company is coming up with a business valuation. Sometimes the valuations provided by the market (translation – a completed transaction) defy all logic. In other industry segments there are some pretty handy rules of thumb for valuation metrics. In one industry it may be 1 X Revenue, in another it could be 7.5 X EBITDA.

Since it is critical to our business to help our healthcare information technology clients maximize their business selling price, I have given this considerable thought. Why are some of these software company valuations so high? It is because of the profitability leverage of technology. A simple example is what is Microsoft’s incremental cost to produce the next copy of Office Professional? It is probably $1.20 for three CD’s and 80 cents for packaging. Let’s say the license cost is $400. The gross margin is north of 99%. That does not happen in manufacturing or services or retail or most other industries.

One problem in selling a small healthcare technology company is that they do not have any of the brand name, distribution, or standards leverage that the big companies possess. So, on their own, they cannot create this profitability leverage. The acquiring company, however, does not want to compensate the small seller for the post acquisition results that are directly attributable to the buyer’s market presence. This is what we refer to as the valuation gap.

What we attempt to do is to help the buyer justify paying a much higher price than a pre-acquisition financial valuation of the target company. In other words, we want to get strategic value for our seller. Below are the factors that we use in our analysis:

1. Cost for the buyer to write the code internally – Many years ago, Barry Boehm, in his book, Software Engineering Economics, developed a constructive cost model for projecting the programming costs for writing computer code. He called it the COCOMO model. It was quite detailed and complex, but I have boiled it down and simplified it for our purposes. We have the advantage of estimating the “projects” retrospectively because we already know the number of lines of code comprising our client’s products. In general terms he projected that it takes 3.6 person months to write one thousand SLOC (source lines of code). So if you looked at a senior software engineer at a $70,000 fully loaded compensation package writing a program with 15,000 SLOC, your calculation is as follows – 15 X 3.6 = 54 person months X $5,800 per month = $313,200 divided by 15,000 = $20.88/SLOC.

Before you guys with 1,000,000 million lines of code get too excited about your $20.88 million business value, there are several caveats. Unfortunately the market does not care and will not pay for what it cost you to develop your product. Secondly, this information is designed to help us understand what it might cost the buyer to develop it internally so that he starts his own build versus buy analysis. Thirdly, we have to apply discounts to this analysis if the software is three generations old legacy code, for example. In that case, it is discounted by 90%. You are no longer a technology sale with high profitability leverage. They are essentially acquiring your customer base and the valuation will not be that exciting.

If, however, your application is a brand new application that has legs, start sizing your yacht. Examples of this might be a click fraud application, Pay Pal, or Internet Telephony. The second high value platform would be where your software technology “leap frogs” a popular legacy application. An example of this is when we sold a company that had completely rewritten their legacy management platform in Microsoft .Net. They leap frogged the dominant player in that space that was supporting multiple second generation solutions. Our client became a compelling strategic acquisition. Fast forward one year and I hear the acquirer is selling one of these $100,000 systems per week. Now that’s leverage!

2. Most acquirers could write the code themselves, but we suggest they analyze the cost of their time to market delay. Believe me, with first mover advantage from a competitor or, worse, customer defections, there is a very real cost of not having your product today. We were able to convince one buyer that they would be able to justify our seller’s entire purchase price based on the number of client defections their acquisition would prevent. As it turned out, the buyer had a huge install base and through multiple prior acquisitions was maintaining six disparate software platforms to deliver essentially the same functionality.

This was very expensive to maintain and they passed those costs on to their disgruntled install base. The buyer had been promising upgrades for a few years, but nothing was delivered. Customers were beginning to sign on with their major competitor. Our pitch to the buyer was to make this acquisition, demonstrate to your client base that you are really providing an upgrade path and give notice of support withdrawal for 4 or 5 of the other platforms. The acquisition was completed and, even though their customers that were contemplating leaving did not immediately upgrade, they did not defect either. Apparently the devil that you know is better than the devil you don’t in the world of healthcare information technology.

3. Another arrow in our valuation driving quiver for our sellers is we restate historical financials using the pricing power of the brand name acquirer. We had one client that was a small healthcare IT company that had developed a fine piece of software that compared favorably with a large, publicly traded company’s solution. Our product had the same functionality, ease of use, and open systems platform, but there was one very important difference. The end-user customer’s perception of risk was far greater with the little IT company that could be “out of business tomorrow.” We were literally able to double the financial performance of our client on paper and present a compelling argument to the big company buyer that those economics would be immediately available to him post acquisition. It certainly was not GAP Accounting, but it was effective as a tool to drive transaction value.

4. Financials are important so we have to acknowledge this aspect of buyer valuation as well. We generally like to build in a baseline value (before we start adding the strategic value components) of 2 X contractually recurring revenue during the current year. So, for example, if the company has monthly maintenance contracts of $100,000 times 12 months = $1.2 million X 2 = $2.4 million as a baseline company value component. Another component we add is for any contracts that extend beyond one year. We take an estimate of the gross margin produced in the firm contract years beyond year one and assign a 5 X multiple to that and discount it to present value.

Let’s use an example where they had 4 years remaining on a services contract and the last 3 years were $200,000 per year in revenue with approximately 50% gross margin. We would take the final tree years of $100,000 annual gross margin and present value it at a 5% discount rate resulting in $265,616. This would be added to the earlier 2 X recurring year 1 revenue from above. Again, this financial analysis is to establish a baseline, before we pile on the strategic value components.

5. We try to assign values for miscellaneous assets that the seller is providing to the buyer. Don’t overlook the strategic value of Blue Chip Accounts. Those accounts become a platform for the buyer’s entire product suite being sold post acquisition into an “installed account.” It is far easier to sell add-on applications and products into an existing account than it is to open up that new account. These strategic accounts can have huge value to a buyer.

6. Finally, we use a customer acquisition cost model to drive value in the eyes of a potential buyer. Let’s say that your sales person at 100% of Quota earns total salary and commissions of $125,000 and sells 5 net new accounts. That would mean that your base customer acquisition cost per account was $25,000. Add a

20% company overhead for the 85 accounts, for example, and the company value, using this methodology would be $2,550,000.

7. Our final valuation component is what we call the defensive factor. This is very real in the healthcare information technology arena. What is the value to a large firm of preventing his competitor from acquiring your technology and improving their competitive position in the marketplace. One of our clients had an outcomes database and nurse staffing software algorithm. The owner was the recognized expert in this area and had industry credibility. This was a small add on application to two large industry players’ integrated hospital applications suite. This module was viewed as providing a slight features advantage to the company that could integrate it with their main systems. The selling price for one of these major software systems to a hospital chain was often more than $50 million. The value paid for our client was determined, not by the financial performance of our client, but by the competitive edge they could provide post acquisition. Our client did very well on her company sale.

After reading this you may be saying to yourself, come on, this is a little far fetched. These components do have real value, but that value is open to a broad interpretation by the marketplace. We are attempting to assign metrics to a very subjective set of components. The buyers are smart, and experienced in the M&A process and quite frankly, they try to deflect these artistic approaches to driving up their financial outlay. The best leverage point we have is that those buyers know that we are presenting the same analysis to their competitors and they don’t know which component or components of value that we have presented will resonate with their competition. In the final analysis, we are just trying to provide the buyers some reasonable explanation for their board of directors to justify paying 8 X revenues for an acquisition.